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Abstract
We study a dynamic model with an incumbent monopolist and entry in every
subsequent period. We first show that if all consumers have the same switching
cost, then the intertemporal profits of the incumbent are the same as if there
was only one period. We then study the consequences of heterogeneity of
switching costs. We prove that even low switching cost customers have value
for the incumbent: when there are more of them its profits increase as their
presence hinders entrants who find it more costly to attract high switching
cost customers.
Key words: switching cost, dynamic competition, incumbency, entry.
In many industries, the market power of incumbents is protected by the
switching costs that consumers have to incur when they purchase from an
entrant. This paper focuses on the consequences of the presence of low
switching cost customers; we find that their presence hinders entrants, who
find it more costly to attract high switching cost customers.
As we will discuss in Section 2, in the simplest static economic model of
switching costs, with one incumbent and at least two entrants, heterogeneity
of switching costs does not matter. If a proportion α > 0 of the agents have
switching cost σ > 0, while the others have no switching cost, the incumbent
will charge σ and its profits will be equal to N × (ασ), the average switching
cost of all the consumers, multiplied by the number of agents, N . We show
that this result changes drastically in a dynamic model in which there are
new potential competitors in every period; the more skewed the distribution
of switching costs, the greater the profits of the incumbent. To the best of our
knowledge, this fact and the importance of the distribution of switching costs
has not been recognized in the literature, despite the existence of a significant
body of theory which explores the consequences of consumer switching costs.
(We discuss the literature below in Section 1.)
Our results have implications for managerial practice and for public policy.
Entrants should beware of not pricing aggressively while attracting footloose
consumers who will not stick with them when they increase prices. Antitrust
authorities should take into account the whole distribution of switching
costs (including the switching costs of consumers who decide to purchase
from entrants) when determining whether incumbent firms are behaving
anticompetitively.
We conduct our analysis by studying a series of models with the following
features: a) the switching costs of consumers are invariant over time; b) at
the start of the ‘game’ there is a single incumbent firm; and c) there is entry
(at least potentially) in every period. Following much of the literature, we
assume that only short term contracts are used and that switching costs do
not depend on the firm from which consumers purchase.
In Section 2, we introduce our analysis by considering the case where
all consumers have the same switching cost σ. In a one period model, the
incumbent would charge σ, and, assuming that the mass of consumers is
equal to 1, its profit would also be equal to σ. We embed this static model
in a dynamic framework and show that in equilibrium aggregate discounted
profit over all periods is also equal to σ, whether the number of periods is
finite or, subject to stationarity assumptions, infinite. In the latter case, this
implies that the profit of the incumbent is equal to the value of a flow of
per period payments equal to (1 − δ)σ, not to σ! Although this result is
very easy to prove, and is implicit in some of the literature, we feel that it is
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worth stressing as it shows that switching costs are a leaner cash cow than
sometimes assumed.
The bulk of our analysis of the heterogeneity of switching costs can be
found in Section 3. A proportion α ∈ (0, 1) of consumers have a switching
cost equal to σ > 0, while the others have no switching cost. We identify the
(stationary) equilibrium of the infinite horizon model. As opposed to the case
where all consumers have the same switching cost, the intertemporal profit of
the incumbent is greater than the one period profit, although it is smaller
than the value of an infinite stream of one period profits. We prove that even
zero switching cost customers have value for the incumbent, despite the fact
that they never purchase its product after entry has occurred: the profits of
the incumbent increase when, keeping fixed the number of high switching
cost consumers, there are more zero switching cost customers. Indeed, their
presence hinders entrants who find it more costly to attract high switching
cost customers.1
In section 4, we examine alternative entry assumptions: we first study the
case where there is only one entrant in every period, and then the case where
the number of entrants is random. Finally, while in the rest of the paper we
assume that price discrimination based on purchasing histories is not possible,
in 4.3 we show that this is not essential for our results and that our results
still hold if we allow firms to price discriminate.
The conclusion discusses further research as well as policy implications.
1 Literature
The literature has distinguished switching cost models proper and subscription
models: in switching cost models, firms must charge the same price to both
current and new consumers, while in subscription models they can offer
different prices to consumers with different purchase histories. Switching
cost models were introduced in the economics literature by [18] (see the
surveys of the theoretical literature in [19], Annex A of [20], and [13], and the
discussion of policy implications in National Economic Research Associates
[20, especially Annex C]). [10] initiated the investigation of subscription
models. We present our model as a switching cost model, but, as discussed
in the introduction and in 4.3, our results also hold for subscription models.
Much of the switching cost literature focuses on two-period duopsony
1However, if the proportion of zero switching cost consumers increase keeping fixed the
total number of consumers (and therefore decreasing the number of high switching cost
consumers) the profits of the incumbent decrease — high switching cost consumers are
still more valuable than zero switching cost consumers.
2
models in which firms choose between charging a high price in order to
extract rents from their customers and charging a low price in order to attract
customers from their rivals. [14], [3], [21], and [1] study infinite horizon
switching cost models, in each of these cases with two firms and homogenous
switching costs;2 they focus on the evolution of market shares and on the
effect of switching costs on prices (see also [16]).
In this framework, [17] shows that higher switching costs may make entry
more likely, by inducing incumbents to abandon the hope of attracting the
customers of other incumbents and therefore choosing higher prices. Farrell
and Klemperer [13, p. 1997] explain that
“the firm must balance the incentive to charge high prices to
‘harvest’ greater current profits . . . against the incentive for low
prices that ‘invest’ in market share and hence increase future
profits.”
Recently, [12] have studied the interaction between these two effects in an
infinite horizon model where a single consumer has random utility and firms
have differentiated products; their focus is on empirics, and, through the use of
simulation methods, they provide numerical examples where prices fall when
switching costs increase. In a theoretical investigation of a simplified version
of this model, [7, 8] has shown that for low switching costs, the incentives of
firms to invest in the acquisition of new customers outweigh their ‘harvesting’
incentives; as a result an increase in switching costs leads to lower prices and
to lower profits.3,4
We also find conditions under which higher switching costs lead to lower
profits for the incumbent, but the reasons are very different from those stressed
in the literature. Whereas previous authors have assumed a fixed number of
firms, there is entry in our models, and therefore competition is more intense.
Thus, the incumbent has no incentive to invest in the acquisition of new
customers, on which it can only make zero profits — indeed, in equilibrium,
the incumbent does not try to “recover” the consumers that it has lost to other
firms. In other words, our comparative statics are entirely the consequence of
the heterogeneity of switching costs, and of the fact that low switching cost
customers protect the incumbent from entry.
2Beggs and Klemperer assume that consumers are horizontally differentiated, but that,
once they have purchased from a firm, they never buy from another firm.
3[2] also provide a theoretical analysis of [12] but, unlike Cabral (and like Dube´ et al.),
they assume that the consumers are myopic. (Our consumers are forward looking.) See
also [9] for a simulation analysis with myopic consumers.
4In a subscription model based on [10], [6] also show that higher swithching costs can
lead to lower profits.
3
The paper that is closest to ours is [22]. It analyzes a finite horizon
subscription model where consumers have different switching costs and where
there is free entry. In his primary model, consumers draw new switching
costs from identical, independent distributions in each period. He shows that
free entry limits the advantages of incumbency and that a firm makes zero
expected profits from the consumers that it attracts from its rivals. In an
extension, Taylor examines a two period model with two types of consumers
who draw their switching cost (as before, independently in each period) from
different distributions. His focus is on the incentives of consumers to build a
reputation of having low switching cost in order to get better offers in the
future, while consumers in our model do not have an incentive to build a
reputation.
In our models, each consumer has switching costs that are constant over
time, which seems a reasonable approximation of reality in many cases, and
this implies that it is harder for an entrant to attract the more valuable
consumers, those with higher switching costs, than to attract the less valuable
customers. As in Taylor, the presence of low switching cost consumers hurts
the high switching cost consumers, but in our model, we show that it can
also increase the incumbent’s profit.
Finally, in our models, incumbent firms find it just as difficult as entrants
to attract customers of other firms. Therefore, incumbent firms, just like
entrants, make zero profits on customers of other firms, and in equilibrium
they ignore them when choosing the price they charge. This is the reason
why our model generates exactly the same results if we transform it into a
subscription model.
2 Homogenous switching costs: “you cannot
get rich on switching costs alone”
In this section, we consider a repeated version of the most standard textbook
model of switching cost, with one incumbent and entry in every period. We
show that, in equilibrium, the profit of the incumbent is equal to its profit in
the one period version of the game. This is true for all equilibria when there
are a finite number of periods, and for stationary equilibria when there are
an infinite number of periods. We begin by presenting the one period version
of the model and then turn to the repeated game with a finite number of
periods.
There is a finite set of N consumers indexed by n = 1, . . . N , and a good
which can be supplied by a number of firms, as we will describe below. In
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previous periods, all the consumers have bought from the Incumbent5 firm I
(we will capitalize Incumbent to denote the firm which is the incumbent at
the beginning of period 1). We do not study the process by which firm I
became the Incumbent, but only the continuation game after entry becomes
possible. In general, at least some of the incumbency rents which we identify
would have been dissipated in the competition to become the Incumbent.
Each consumer has a perfectly inelastic demand for one unit of the good.
In this section only, all consumers have the same switching cost σ. This
switching cost is incurred every time a consumer changes from one supplier
to another. It reflects industry wide similarities or compatibilities between
products, rather than idiosyncrasies of specific sellers. This implies, for
instance, that our comparative statics results which describe the consequences
in changes of the switching costs bear on circumstances where the cost of
changing between any pair or products increase or decrease.
2.1 One period
Let us consider first a one period model and at least two entrants who can
enter the market at zero cost. The main focus of our study is the following
“Bertrand” game:
Stage 1: The Incumbent and the entrants set prices;
Stage 2: The consumers choose from which firm to buy.
All of our results also hold true, and are sometimes easier to establish, in
the “Stackelberg” version of this game:
Stage 1: The Incumbent sets a price;
Stage 2: The entrants set their prices;
Stage 3: The consumers choose from which firm to buy.
In the one period case, these models are exactly equivalent to standard
models of competition where the incumbent has a quality or cost advantage
equal to σ.
In all the paper, we will identify subgame perfect equilibria in undominated
strategies.
Assuming, as we will throughout this paper that all firms have zero
marginal cost, it is easy to prove that, in both the Bertrand and Stackelberg
versions of the game, there is (essentially) only one equilibrium, where the
Incumbent6 charges σ, the entrants 0, and all consumers buy from the
Incumbent whose profit is Nσ.
5In the dynamic version of the model, there could be, in some periods t > 1, several
incumbents, i.e., firms who have sold goods to a positive number of consumers in previous
period.
6The results would be the same with several incumbents.
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2.2 Dynamic model with a finite number of periods
We will now show that in the repeated version of the game, the discounted
intertemporal profit of the Incumbent is the same as in the one period version
of the game: it is still equal to Nσ. One can only pocket the switching cost
once.7
This is very easy to prove when there are two periods. Formally, we expand
the game of 2.1 in the following way. The set of second period incumbents is
composed of all the firms that have sold at least one unit in the first period.
For definitiveness, we assume that the firms that have sold no unit in the first
period “drop out” of the game.8 In period 2, there is a finite set containing
at least two entrants. In the Stackelberg version of our model, if there are
several incumbents at the start of period 2, they all announce their prices
simultaneously in stage 1 of the second period.
We assume that firms cannot commit to prices beyond the current period
and, until 4.3, that firms cannot discriminate between consumers.
In equilibrium, whether in the Bertrand or Stackelberg model, all second
period incumbents charge σ, and make profits equal to σ multiplied by the
number of their first period customers. Therefore, the lower bound of the
prices that entrants can charge in the first period and not make negative
profits is −δσ, where δ ∈ (0, 1] is the discount rate.9 Consumers know that all
incumbents will charge σ in the second period. Hence, firm I will be able to
“keep” its customers only by charging a price less than or equal to −δσ+σ. It
is straightforward to show that it indeed charges this price and “keeps” all its
customers, under Bertrand or Stackelberg competition. Hence its discounted
7Although the model we use is a trivial extension of the most elementary model of
switching costs, we have not found in the literature a clear statement of what happens
when this game is repeated, with new entrants in every period; almost all of the literature
focuses on the case of duopsony, where the same two firms compete again each other period
after period.
8 Formally, if a firm has zero sales in period 1, in period 2 it has zero sales whatever
the price it announces. All our results would hold if the entrants who do not sell in one
period are also present in future periods. They would also hold if new entrants appeared
in period 2 only if all period 1 entrants sold at least one unit of the good in period 1.
9This negative price should be interpreted as a discount below marginal cost. Thus,
like much of the literature, we assume that entrants can charge prices below marginal cost,
and this is often the case in commercial practice.
In some cases −δσ could be greater than the marginal cost, and, in practice, the entrant
may not be able to offer the full discount that we assume, for instance because consumers
have free disposal. The constraint which this imposes on the strategies of the firms have
been studied recently by [11]. Throughout the paper, we assume that this constraint does
not bind.
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profit is
N [(−δσ + σ) + δσ] = Nσ.
An easy proof by induction shows that the same result holds with any finite
number of periods.
2.3 Stationary dynamic model with an infinite number
of periods
We now show that the results of 2.2 also hold true in the pure strategy
stationary solutions of the infinite horizon version of this model10 (we now
assume δ < 1).
Strategies are defined as usual: in the first stage of the first period the
Incumbent chooses a price in the Stackelberg version of the game or the
Incumbent and the entrants choose prices in the Bertrand version. Thereafter
players choose their moves as a function of the history of the game. We
identify stationary strategies which we define in the following way: there
exists a price p∗ and a price pE such that along the equilibrium paths of the
game and of every subgame in every period all incumbents charge p∗ and
every entrant charge pE, where “incumbents” are all the firms which sold
at least one unit in the previous period. (When in section 3, we consider
different types of consumers and mixed strategies, we will need to complete
this definition.)
Thus, the strategies of the firms only depend on whether they sold to
consumers in the past period. They do not depend on the prices charged in
the past, on the firms’ identities, or how many incumbents were in the market
this period or in the past period.
We now state and prove the main result11 of this section.
Proposition 1. In both the Stackelberg and the Bertrand models, when all
consumers have the same switching costs σ, the intertemporal discounted profit
of the Incumbent is equal to Nσ, whatever the number of periods.
10 As above, we assume that in every period there are least two entrants (although this
is not strictly necessary, see section 4). As in 2.2 (see footnote 8), it is easier to think of
the firms that did not sell anything in a period dropping out of the game: if their sales are
equal to zero in period t, in any subsequent period they have zero sales whatever price
they announce. This ensures that the number of “active” firms does not become infinite,
11In a companion paper, [4] prove that there exist many other equilibria of this game
which satisfy a weaker version of stationarity: although the outcome of the game is
stationary (with prices in each period as low as 0 or as high as σ), after a deviation
incumbents may charge prices different from the prices along the equilibrium path.
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Proof. In 2.2, we have shown that the result holds when there is a finite
number of periods. We prove it now for an infinite horizon in the Bertrand
case. The Stackelberg case is very similar and somewhat easier to prove.
We first establish that σ(1− δ) is an upper bound on p∗. By stationarity,
whether consumers purchase from an incumbent or an entrant, in future
periods they will have the same opportunities to purchase the good at a
total cost equal to min{p∗, pE + σ}. Hence, in the current period, consumers
will necessarily choose to purchase from an entrant who charges p′ < p∗ − σ.
Therefore, for any ε > 0, an entrant who would charge p∗ − σ − ε would
attract customers, and obtain profits equal to the number of consumers it
attracted multiplied by
p∗ − σ − ε+ δp
∗
1− δ .
Writing that this expression is negative for all ε > 0 yields p∗ ≤ σ(1− δ).
We now show that σ(1−δ) is also a lower bound on p∗, which will complete
the proof. In any period, the lowest priced entrant must charge p∗ − σ:
otherwise the incumbent(s) could increase its (their) price(s) without loosing
customers. If the entrant attracted customers at this price it would make
profits equal to the mass of these customers multiplied by p∗−σ+ δp∗/(1− δ),
which must be non negative for p∗ − σ to be undominated.
Thus, the only possible equilibrium price is if p∗ = σ(1− δ).
We now show that there does exist an equilibrium. If the incumbents
charge σ(1 − δ), it is a best response for the entrants to charge −σδ and
for consumers to all purchase from their respective incumbents. By the
construction above, clearly there can be no profitable deviation.
3 Heterogenous switching costs
We now turn to the main theme of the article: the consequences of heteroge-
nous switching costs. In this section, we study a model with two types of
consumers: Nh high switching cost (hsc) consumers, and N` low switching
cost (lsc) consumers who have a switching cost12 equal to 0. There are
therefore N = Nh +N` > 0 consumers. We call α = Nh/N the proportion of
hsc consumers. We keep the same assumptions on entry as in 2.3 (see also
footnote 10).
With such a population of consumers, in the one period model, entrants
would charge 0 while the incumbent would charge σ and obtain a profit equal
to Nhσ = N × (ασ): under the assumptions of this section, its profits are the
12See the conclusion for the consequences of assuming that the lsc consumers have
strictly positive switching costs.
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average switching cost of consumers multiplied by their number. We analyze
the infinite horizon version of this game.
3.1 Results
As in the model of section 2 where consumers all have the same switching
cost, we restrict attention to equilibria that satisfy stationarity conditions,
and where players do not use weakly dominated strategies.
In section 2, stationarity required that in any period, all incumbents,
i.e., all firms that had sold to at least one consumer in the previous period,
charged p∗. With different types of consumers, we need to redefine the notion
of incumbent: we will say that for any period t ≥ 2 an incumbent is a firm
which has sold a unit of the good to at least one hsc consumer. We also
need to redefine the notion of entrants. A “generalized entrant” in period t
is either a period t entrant or a firm who has sold only to lsc consumers in
period t− 1. To lighten the terminology, we will use the term “entrant” to
refer to “generalized entrants” and will specify “period t entrant” when we
want to refer to a firm which was not present in period t− 1.
With this change of definition, we adapt the definition of stationarity as
follows. First, in the Stackelberg case where there are pure strategy equilibria,
all incumbents, that is all firms who have sold at least one unit of the good to
one hsc consumer in the previous period, charge the same price, whether or
not they also sold to a lsc customer (which they will never do in equilibrium!).
All entrants also charge the same price. In the Bertrand competition case
of 3.2.2, where no pure strategy equilibrium exists, we look for equilibria such
that all incumbents use the same mixed strategy. We also assume that the
distribution of the lowest price charged by any entrant is the same in every
period.
The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 2. In the infinite horizon model, where Nh = αN consumers
have switching costs equal to σ > 0, while the remaining consumers have 0
switching costs, under either Stackelberg or Bertrand competition the expected
profit of the incumbent is
Π = N × ασ
1− δ + αδ . (1)
Proposition 2 yields interesting comparative statics, which we discuss
in 3.3.
Although they lead to the same profits for the incumbent, the equilib-
ria under Bertrand and Stackelberg competition are very different. Under
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Stackelberg competition, the Incumbent offers the same price in every period,
and hsc consumers never change suppliers. In Bertrand competition, the
incumbent and the entrants play mixed strategies, and in each period there
is a strictly positive probability that all the hsc consumers change suppliers.
The next subsection presents the proof of Proposition 2. It can be skipped
by readers mostly interested in the consequences of our analysis, which are
discussed in 3.3.
3.2 Proof of Proposition 2
3.2.1 Analysis of Stackelberg competition
We show that
pS = ασ
1− δ
1− δ + αδ
is the equilibrium price that the Incumbent charges in the first period and
which incumbents charge in any subgame. Along the equilibrium path, the
Incumbent sells to all the hsc consumers and to no lsc consumer.
We first show that pS is an upper bound on the equilibrium price p∗. Let
pE the minimum of the prices charged by any entrant (this minimum exists
as there are a finite number of entrants in each period). By stationarity, if
pE < p
∗ − σ all consumers purchase from one of the lowest price entrants.
The profits of one of these entrants is equal to the number of consumers which
it has attracted multiplied by pE + αδp
∗/(1− δ). If this profit per customer
were strictly positive, at least one of the lowest price entrants would find it
profitable to slightly undercut the others. Therefore,
(p∗ − σ) + δαp
∗
1− δ ≤ 0⇐⇒ p
∗ ≤ σ 1− δ
1− δ + αδ = p
S.
To show that pS is a lower bound on p∗, we show that if p∗ < pS a
deviation by the incumbent to any p′ ∈ (p∗, pS) would be profitable. Indeed,
entrant(s) who would respond by charging p′ − σ or less would generate
aggregate discounted profits of at most [p′ − σ + δαp∗/(1− δ)]N . (This is
their profit if they attract all the hsc consumers.) If both p′ and p∗ are strictly
smaller than pS, this expression is strictly negative. Therefore, at least one of
the entrants would be making strictly negative profits; the deviation by the
incumbent is profitable, as entrants would not be able to respond profitably.
We have therefore proven that in any equilibrium p∗ = pS
Now, we show by construction that there does exist such an equilibrium.
In period 1, the incumbent charges pS and entrants charge 0. All the hsc
consumers purchase from the incumbent while all the lsc consumers purchase
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from one of the lowest priced entrants. In period t > 1, the incumbents
charges pS while the entrants charge 0. All consumers purchase from the firm
from which they purchased the previous period. By construction, there are
no profitable deviations. This proves the theorem in the Stackelberg case.
3.2.2 Analysis of Bertrand competition
In the Bertrand game, there is no equilibrium in which the incumbent charges
pS = −δΠ + σ and at least one entrant charges pS − σ = −δΠ. Indeed, if the
incumbent did not retain all the hsc customers, he would have incentives
to decrease its price; if it retained them, the entrant would attract only the
lsc consumers, who generate no profit in future periods, at a negative price.
More generally, it is easy to show that there is no pure strategy equilibrium of
the game, but we will still be able to show that the profits of the incumbent
are equal to the profits in Stackelberg competition.
The general plan of the proof is a follows. We prove that, if Π is the
(expected) profit of the incumbent, then −δΠ + σ > 0 belongs to the support
of the distribution of prices that it announces; furthermore when it chooses
this price, its hsc customers purchase its product with probability 1 and lsc
customers always purchase from one of the entrants. This implies that Eq. (1)
holds. (More precisely, we will show that −δΠ + σ is the lower bound on
the support of prices charged by the incumbent, and that when it chooses a
price arbitrarily close to this lower bound, it ‘keeps’ the hsc customers with
probability arbitrarily close to 1.) We conclude the proof by computing the
distribution of prices and by showing that an equilibrium exists.
The incumbents choose prices on an interval whose lower bound is bI and
whose upper bound is bI . In any state of nature, the effective constraint on
the incumbents comes from the smallest price charged by an entrant. We call
bE and bE the lower and upper bounds of the distribution of this smallest
price. We begin by computing these bounds.
We proceed through a series of claims.
Claim 1. Incumbents have strictly positive profits, which implies bI > 0.
Proof. We assume that incumbents have profits equal to 0, and show that
this lead to a contradiction. Because we are looking for stationary equilibria,
any entrant who would attract consumers would become an incumbent in
the next period, and therefore make 0 profits. Therefore charging a negative
price is a dominated strategy for entrants and competition among them leads
them to announce a price of 0.
Now assume that an incumbent deviates in period t and charges p′ ∈
(0, (1 − δ)σ). An upper bound for the total cost that an hsc consumer
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can incur by purchasing from the incumbent in period t and switching in
period t+ 1 is p′ + δ(σ + C), where C is his expected cost of purchase along
the equilibrium path. This is strictly smaller than σ + δC, which is a lower
bound of the cost that he would incur by purchasing from an entrant in
period t. Therefore there exists a profitable deviation for the incumbent.
Claim 2. In any period, the expected discounted profit of entrants is equal
to 0 and bE ≤ 0.
Proof. The expected discounted profits of entrants are the same for all prices
in (bE, bE). If the distribution of pE does not have a mass point at bE, then
the expected profit of an entrant who chooses this price is 0, as he has zero
sales with probability 1. If the distribution of pE has a mass point at bE,
an entrant which charges bE cannot make a strictly positive profit: charging
a price slightly below bE would yield even greater profits, which cannot be
true in equilibrium because of competition between entrants. This proves
that the profits of entrants are not positive and therefore are equal to 0. By
Claim 1, with bE > 0, an entrant could make a positive profit by charging
a price in (0,min{bI , bE}), attract the lsc consumers (and, maybe, some
hsc consumers) with probability 1 and make strictly positive profits, which
establishes the contradiction.
By Claims 1 and 2, lsc consumers never buy from an incumbent. There-
fore, the expected profit of an incumbent is independent of the number of
its lsc customers in the previous period. This enables us to define, without
ambiguity, Π as the profit of an incumbent from whom all the hsc consumers
purchased in the previous period. Any incumbent would have discounted
profits equal to Π/N multiplied by the number of its customers in the previous
period. We will now proceed to demonstrate that the incumbent equilibrium
profit is the same in the Bertrand model as in the Stackelberg model.
We now establish the lower bounds on prices charged by incumbents and
entrants.
Claim 3. bE = −δΠ and bI = −δΠ + σ.
Proof. Clearly, bE ≥ −δΠ; otherwise whenever pE ∈ [bE,−δΠ), the aggregate
expected discounted profits of the lowest price entrants would be strictly
negative. Furthermore, by announcing any price strictly smaller than bE + σ,
the incumbent “leaves money on the table” and therefore bI ≥ bE + σ.
If we had bE > δΠ, by choosing a price in (−δΠ, bE) an entrant would with
probability 1 be the lowest price entrant and underprice all the incumbents
by more than σ. It would make strictly positive profits, which contradicts
Claim 2. Thus, bE = −δΠ (and bE > −δΠ, as entrants use a mixed strategy).
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With bI > −δΠ + σ, an entrant could make positive profits by choosing a
price in (−δΠ,min{bI − σ, bE}), which contradicts Claim 2.
We now compute the profits of the Incumbent. We will need the following
lemma.
Claim 4. When pI , the price charged by an incumbent, converges to bI from
above, the probability that it sells to all its hsc customers of the previous
period converges to 1.
Proof. The probability that all its hsc customers from the previous period
purchase from an incumbent is decreasing in the price pI that it charges; let
η be limit as pI converges from above to bI as the probability that past hsc
customers will choose to purchase from the incumbent. The profit of the
incumbent, if it sold the good to a proportion ζ of consumers in the previous
period, converges to13
ζ(ηNhbI + ηδΠ) < ζ(NhbI + δΠ).
By Claim 3, it can guarantee itself a profit arbitrarily close to ζ(NhbI + δΠ)
by charging a price below, but very close to bI , which establishes that η must
be 1.
Claim 4 implies that there is no mass point at bI in the distribution of
the prices charged by incumbents. Furthermore, it implies that we have
Π = NhbI + δΠ, which implies that (1) holds.
We now must prove that there exists such an equilibrium. To do this
we begin by deriving the distribution of prices that must prevail in any
equilibrium.
Distribution of prices in equilibrium Assuming that an equilibrium
does exist, we compute the distribution of pE and pI . Below, we show that
there indeed exists an equilibrium corresponding to these distributions.
Using the zero profit condition for the entrants the distribution of prices
announced by the incumbents satisfy
GI(pE+σ)×[(1−α)NpE]+(1−GI(pE+σ))×[NpE+δΠ] = 0 ∀pE ∈ (bE, bE)
=⇒ GI(pI) = N(pI − σ) + δΠ
αN(pI − σ) + δΠ ∀pI ∈ (bI , bI). (2)
13If some of the hsc consumers do not purchase from the incumbent, none of the lsc
consumers will.
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Because lim
pI→bI+
GI(pI) = 0 and lim
pI→bI−
GI(pI) = 1, the function GI has no mass
point.
Similarly, the distribution GE of pE is determined by the fact that the
profits of the incumbent are equal to Π for all prices in [bI , bI ], and therefore
GE(pE) = 1− Π
αN(pE + σ) + δΠ
∀pE ∈ (bE, bE). (3)
Because
lim
pE→0−
GE(0) =
αNσ − (1− δ)Π
αNσ + δΠ
=
αδ
1 + αδ
< 1,
the distribution GE has a mass point at pE = bE = 0. We can imple-
ment by distribution GE(pE), by having each of the k generalized entrants
independently choosing their price according to distribution GE,k(pE) =
1− k√1−GE(pE).
Existence of an equilibrium We have proved that if there exists an
equilibrium that satisfies our assumptions, the distribution of prices must
satisfy Eq. (2) and (3). We now prove that there does indeed exist such an
equilibrium; this is a proof by construction: we exhibit the strategies followed
by the agents.
In this equilibrium a) the consumers who buy from an entrant always buy
from the same (lowest price) entrant and b) consumers who are indifferent
between purchasing from this entrant and from the incumbent from which they
purchased in the previous period purchase from the incumbent. The analysis
which we have conducted to derive (2) and (3), shows that these strategies
are best responses for all the agents when there is only one incumbent.
We need to examine the continuation equilibrium when there are several
incumbents, for two reasons: a) for the consumers to only purchase from
the Incumbent in equilibrium, it must be the case that it is not a profitable
deviation for hsc consumers to purchase from another firm than other hsc
consumers; b) we have imposed the requirement that all incumbents, i.e.,
all firms that have sold to hsc consumers in the previous period, use the
same pricing strategy and we need to show that there exists an equilibrium
with this property. As we will see, the fact that the strategies of the firms
satisfy b) provides an easy proof of point a).
Let us therefore assume that in one period there are n ≥ 2 incumbents.
It is straightforward to see that if the distribution of pE is GE, then all the
incumbents are indifferent between all prices in [bI , bI ]. We now show that
the profits of the lowest price entrants are equal to 0 if all the incumbents
choose the strategy described by (2).
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Let N i be the number of hsc consumers of incumbent i = 1 . . . , K in the
previous period. The lowest price entrant sells to all the lsc consumers and
to the hsc consumers who were in the previous period clients of firms who
choose in the current period a price pi > pE + σ. Because it will follow the
same strategy as a unique incumbent, and because the distribution of prices
of the entrant is independent of the number of incumbents, its profits per
hsc customer discounted to the beginning of next period will be δΠ/Nh .
Therefore, for given prices by the incumbents, the profit of the entrant is
N`pE +
∑
{i|pi>pE+σ}
(N ipE +
N i
Nh
δΠ) = N`pE +
∑
{i|pi>pE+σ}
N i ×
(
pE +
N i
Nh
δΠ
)
= N`pE +
∑
i
si(pi)
(
pE +
δΠ
αN
)
,
where si is the random variable, of expected value N
i(1−GI(pE + σ)), that
takes the value Ni for pi > pE +σ and 0 otherwise. The pi’s are independently
distributed, and therefore the expected value of
∑
si(pi) is αN(1−GI(pE+σ)),
and the expected profit of the lowest price entrant, conditional of the fact
that it has chosen a price of pE, is
(1− α)NpE + (αNpE + δΠ)(1−GI(pE + σ)),
which, by Eq. (2), is equal to 0.
Because all incumbents use the same pricing strategy hsc consumers have
no incentive to deviate from the focal strategy described above: in subsequent
periods, they would face the same distribution of prices both from the firm
they purchased from in previous periods and from the entrants.
3.3 Economic consequences of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 yields interesting profit comparisons and comparative statics,
which we summarize in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Under the conditions of Proposition 2:
i. Π is greater than the profit of the incumbent in the one period model,
Nασ, but smaller than the value of an infinite stream of one period profits,
Nασ/(1− δ).
ii. Π is strictly smaller than Nσ, but lim
δ→1
Π = Nσ for all α.
iii. Π is increasing in α, σ and δ;
iv. for a given average level of consumer switching costs, ασ, the profit of
the incumbent, Π, is decreasing in α;
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v. adding lsc consumers without changing the number of hsc consumers
increases Π;
vi. under Stackelberg competition, the utility of hsc consumers is an
increasing function of α.
Part i of the proposition show that, contrary to what happens when all
consumers have the same switching costs, the intertemporal profit is not equal
to the one period profit, but is greater ; however the per period profit is smaller
in the infinite horizon model than in the one period model. The discounted
profit is equal to the one period profit discounted at the rate δ(1−α).14 Part ii
shows that when the agents are very patient, the profit of the incumbent is
independent of the proportion α of hsc consumers, whereas in the one period
model profits are proportional to α. As we will explain below, lsc consumers,
who always purchase from the lowest price entrant, make it more costly to
attract profitable hsc customers away from the incumbent.
Parts iii and iv of the corollary are obvious from Eq. (1). Part v is easy
to prove. Assume that we add η > 0 lsc consumers; the total number of
consumers becomes N ′ = N+η and the proportion of hsc consumers becomes
α′ = αN/(N + η). The new profits of the Incumbent are
Π′ = (N + η)
α′σ
1− δ + α′δ =
αNσ
1− δ + α
1+η
δ
,
which is increasing in η. Lsc consumers are valuable to the incumbent, even
though they never purchase its product, as they make it more costly for
entrants to make aggressive discounts in order to attract hsc customers.
We now provide an intuition for why adding lsc consumers in the market
increases the profit of the Incumbent’s despite the fact that it never sells to
these consumers.15 Entrants are willing to price below marginal cost and
make short term losses to attract hsc consumers whom they can “exploit” in
the future. However, any offer which is attractive to hsc consumers is even
more attractive to lsc consumers, who do not generate any future profits.
Hence, their presence reduces the willingness of entrants to price aggressively
and benefits the Incumbent.
As we discussed at the end of 3.1, the profits of the Incumbent are the
same in the Bertrand and in the Stackelberg models, and in both of them the
profits of the entrants are smaller. On the other hand, social welfare is lower
14In a companion paper, we analyze the same model with only two periods. The
discounted profit of the Incumbent is Nασ(1 + δ − αδ): this is again the value of a flow of
the one period profit discounted at the rate δ(1− α).
15We thank the editor for suggesting this intuition.
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with Bertrand competition, because resources are wasted in switching. This
implies that consumer welfare is also lower with Bertrand competition.
Furthermore, in the mixed strategy Bertrand equilibrium the incumbent
trades off the risk of keeping the hsc consumers at a high price with the
risk of losing them to an entrant. Similarly, the entrants trade off the risk
of undercutting the incumbent’s price by more than σ and attracting the
hsc consumers and making a positive profit with the loss of pricing below
marginal costs and attracting only the lsc consumers. Thus, in the Bertrand
model we see stochastic turnover of the incumbent which is not present in
the Stackelberg model.
4 Limited entry and price discrimination
Up to this point, we have assumed that there are at least two potential
entrants in every period, but in many industries with important switching
costs there is relatively little entry. The main aim of this section is to explore
the ways in which our analysis can be adapted to take into account limited
entry.
In 4.3, we show that the results of the paper are not changed if firms can
discriminate between old and new customers.
The Supplementary material for this article [5] contains more extensive
proofs and discussions of the material in this section.
4.1 A single entrant in each period
In this subsection, we assume that there is a single entrant in each period;
for simplicity, we discuss our results using the Stackelberg model.
If consumers all have the same switching cost σ the proof of Proposition 1
still holds. The equilibrium profit of the Incumbent is Nσ and it sells to all
consumers in every period.
With heterogenous consumers, after the first period, nothing is changed
as the firm(s) who have acquired lsc consumers in previous periods compete
with the entrants. On the other hand, it is not an equilibrium strategy for
the Incumbent to charge pS in the first period. If it charges pI slightly greater
than pS, the first period entrant finds it more profitable to charge “slightly less”
than pI and attract all the lsc consumers and none of the hsc consumers
than to charge slightly less than pI − σ.
As the first period is fundamentally different from subsequent periods, we
must adapt our definition of stationarity. We define two states. In State 2, at
least one firm sold only to lsc consumers in the previous period. Otherwise
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we are in State 1, where the game starts. We identify equilibria where State 1
occurs only in the first period.
In State 2, the current period entrant and the firm(s) who sold only to
lsc consumers in previous periods compete to attract hsc consumers. The
reasoning of section 3.2.1 can be reused essentially unchanged and incumbents
charge pS. The only caveat is that we must ensure that there is no profitable
deviation that sends the system back in State 1; we do this below.
To understand pricing in State 1, consider the first period. The incumbent
charges the greatest pI such that the entrant is indifferent between charging
a price slightly below pI and attracting all the lsc consumers and charging
slightly below pI − σ and attracting all the consumers. This pI satisfies
N(pI − σ) + δΠ1 = N`pI , where Π1 is equilibrium profit of an incumbent in
State 1; it satisfies Π1 = Nhp
1 + δΠ2 where p
1 is the price charged by the
incumbent in period 1 and Π2 is the equilibrium profit of an incumbent in
State 2 if has sold to all the hsc consumers in the previous period; by our
discussion in the previous paragraph, Π2 is equal to the Π of Eq. (1). Simple
manipulations yield Π1 and p
1. Because it does not face any competition in
the market for lsc consumers, the first period entrant makes strictly positive
profits, Nlp
1.
Having only a single entrant in period 1 allows the Incumbent to obtain
greater profits than in our base model; thus the intertemporal profit is here
also greater than the flow profit. The effects of changes in δ are different from
the base model: the profit of the Incumbent is the same for δ = 0 and δ = 1
and convex in δ.
Transitions from State 2 to State 1 We must still show that there is
an equilibrium such that the system remains in state 2 once it is there. If
the system enters period t in State 2, at least two firms do not have any hsc
consumers. Whatever price these firms charge, there exists a continuation
equilibrium such that not all the firms have at least one hsc consumer in
period t. In that equilibrium all hsc consumers who switch firms purchase
from the same firm. There is no incentive for these hsc consumers to deviate
and purchase from another firm which has no hsc customer: this would not
decrease the price paid in the current period, but may increase the price they
pay in period t+ 1 if this purchase moves the system from State 2 to State 1.
4.2 A random number of entrants in each period
Consider now a model when the number of entrants is random. In period 1,
and as long as there has been no previous entry, there there is a single entrant
with probability q1, two or more entrants with probability q2 and no entry
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with probability 1− q1 − q2 = 1− q > 0. For simplicity, if there is entry in a
period, there is at least one entrant in every subsequent period. Incumbents
know whether entry has occurred when they set their price.
To eliminate the possibility of infinite prices, consumers assign a value V
to the good, with V large enough that the results above hold. As in 4.1, we
assume Stackelberg timing.
As in 4.1, with homogenous consumers. once entry has occurred the present
discounted value of the incumbent’s profit is Nσ. Let Π¯ be the expected profit
of the incumbent before it knows whether there will be entry in the current
period if there was no entry in previous periods: Π¯ = Nqσ+(1−q)(NV +δΠ¯).
The relationship between one period profits and infinite horizon profits are
the same as in point i. of Proposition 2.
With heterogenous consumers, the incumbent’s expected profit ΠI satisfies
ΠI = (1 − q1 − q2)(NV + δΠI) + q1Π1 + q2Π. It is a probability adjusted
convex combination of facing no entrant, a single entrant, and at least two
entrants in the current period.
4.3 Price discrimination
Up until now, as discussed in the introduction, we have assumed that firms
could not price discriminate between consumers on the basis of their pur-
chasing histories: we have studied switching cost as opposed to subscription
models. This does not affect the results. Indeed, suppose that we allowed
an incumbent firm in period t to have different prices for its old and new
customers. In this case, the incumbent firm is exactly in the same position as
an entrant as far as attracting new lsc consumers goes. In all our discussion,
except for the discussion in 4.1, the profits of entrants are equal to zero, and
the Incumbent would not gain from being able to price discriminate.16
5 Conclusion
A significant body of theory explores the consequences of consumer switching
costs: it highlights the role of “bargain then rip-off” pricing patterns, where a
firm makes very profitable introductory offers and raises its price in subsequent
periods. To the best of our knowledge, the fact that the distribution of
switching costs changes considerably the way in which these strategies play
16Even in the case of one entrant, it would actually not gain from being able to price
discriminate. It is only in the first period that the entrant makes a positive profit, and in
the first period, the Incumbent has no scope for discrimination as all the consumers have
the same purchasing history.
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out has not been pointed out. We hope the present paper will contribute to
close this gap. Taking into account the heterogeneity of switching costs has
enabled us to identify very rich strategic interactions between the incumbent
and the entrants and led to surprising comparative statics.
Our results should affect policy analysis. For instance, the liberalized UK
domestic gas and electricity markets analyzed by NERA in [20] appears to
broadly fit the context we consider: the product is homogeneous, discrim-
ination between old and new customers was not an option, and entrants
had to attract customers away from the historical incumbent (British Gas
and the public electricity suppliers) as there were practically no unattached
customers. Entrants offered prices below cost, and a fortiori below those of
the incumbent(s), which saw their market share decrease. Our analysis shows
that information on the distribution of switching costs, for which no data is
given, should have been gathered and that its consequences for the strategy
of the entrants should have been considered.
Our results should also have consequences for the empirical work which
tries to estimate the consequences of changes of switching costs on prices.
For instance, [23] examines the effect introducing number portability for toll
free calling (if consumers change phone companies they can keep their same
number). This reduces the switching costs of buyers of toll free services. If
consumers have different switching costs and these switching costs are affected
differentially by the change to number portability, then not only do average
switching cost fall, but the distribution of switching cost changes. Similarly,
[15] examine a switching cost model in banking. Our work demonstrates that
when the empirical work does not take into account how the distribution of
switching cost changes, then the estimated model maybe misspecified.
On the theoretical side, we have used a very stark model, with entry in
every period whereas much of the literature on switching costs has emphasized
models where a limited number of incumbents compete over time, trying
to vie for each other’s consumers. In the rest of this conclusion, we briefly
discuss some extensions of the model.
In an earlier version of this article, we allowed for a continuum of consumers.
Due to measurability issues, this led to a more complicated definition of
stationarity, but led to an equilibrium which takes exactly the same form as
with a finite number of consumers. Thus, our results are robust to assuming
that consumers are ‘small’ .
In a companion piece, we allow the low switching cost, σ`, to take a strictly
positive value rather than being equal to 0 as in the present paper. Due
to technical issues involving the definition of equilibrium and stationarity,
we are only able to solved the model for a two period model. For a large
range of parameters, the profit of the Incumbent is decreasing in σ`. Indeed,
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if in the first period all or nearly all the hsc consumers purchase from the
Incumbent, the entrants, even those with a small number of hsc consumers
in there clientele will choose to charge σ` in the second period. This provides
an incentive for hsc customers to purchase from an entrant in the second
period, and the larger σ`, the more will do so. Thus, the larger σl the more
hsc consumers the Incumbent loses in the first period, and one can show that
this induces a decrease in its profits.
We finish by discussing a few extension and venues for future research.
The first extension would be to allow for the presence of fixed costs for
entrants. Assume that the fixed cost are incurred before any firm sets its
price, and that it is small enough that there is entry. Then, as in the standard
Bertrand model, the only equilibria are mixed strategy equilibria. When
at least two potential entrants actually enter, the pricing decisions in the
continuation game will be exactly the same as without entry costs. With zero
or one entrant, on the other hand, prices will be higher. We believe that, in
general, the presence of switching costs would mitigate the effects studied
in this paper. Indeed, an increase in the number of lsc consumers or an
increase in σL will lead to a higher probability that there will be at least two
entrants, and therefore to lower prices.
Another interesting avenue for future research is to assume that in each
period some consumers are replaced with new consumers who are initially
not tied to any firm.17 To get the flavor of what the equilibrium would look
like, we make the following observations, assuming that the proportion of
new consumers is small. First, an incumbent with some consumers who have
purchased in the past will not try to attract new consumers, and, as in the
main body of the paper, only the lowest priced entrants will attract new
consumers. The number of incumbents will therefore grow from period to
period, and their market shares will shrink. Furthermore, entrants should
price as aggressively as when there were no new consumers. This will lead to
lower incumbent prices and profits.
We have done some very preliminary work on a two period model where
the distribution of switching costs is drawn from a continuous distribution.
Additional complications occur when doing comparative statics in this model,
since entrants in period 1 will become incumbents in period 2 and will lose
some consumers in period 2 if the lowest bound on switching cost is small
enough. This may be an interesting avenue to pursue more fully in the future.
We have not been able to identify the equilibria in a infinite horizon model,
17In an interesting working paper, Rhodes (2012) analyzes an overlapping generation,
Hotelling model where all consumers have the same switching costs. He assumes for most
of the paper that a consumer’s location in the second period is independent of their first
period location.
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except in the case where the switching cost of the lsc consumers is equal to 0.
Solving this problem raises interesting, but difficult, questions: in particular,
we are not sure that a stationary equilibrium exists; we do not even know the
appropriate definition of stationarity for that case.
Finally, network externalities often play a role similar to switching costs —
they have sometimes been called ‘collective’ switching costs. In future work,
we plan to study models where agents have different trade-offs between size
of network and prices; we believe that phenomena similar to those analyzed
in the current paper can be identified.
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